


# Workers' Compensation Reference Guide

## Oklahoma





# OKLAHOMA WORKERS' COMPENSATION

## FOR ACCIDENTS OCCURRING ON OR AFTER 5/28/2019

### I. JURISDICTION – (85A O.S. § 3)

#### A. Act will apply where:

1. Injuries received and occupational diseases contracted in Oklahoma.
2. Contract of employment made in Oklahoma and employee was acting in the course of such employment under the discretion of the employer.
3. Claimant may not receive workers' compensation benefits in Oklahoma if claimant filed a claim in another jurisdiction unless the WCC determines there is a change of circumstances that create a good cause. Claimant cannot receive duplicate benefits. Oklahoma time limitations still apply per Section 69.

### II. ACCIDENTS - (85A O.S. § 2):

#### A. Compensable Injury:

1. Compensable injury is defined as damage or harm to the physical structure of the body or prosthetic appliance including eyeglasses, contact lenses or hearing aids of which the major cause is either accidental, cumulative trauma or occupational disease arising out of the course and scope of the employment.
2. The accident should be unintended, unanticipated, unforeseen, unplanned and unexpected; occur at a specifically identifiable time and place; occur by chance from unknown cause; is independent of sickness, mental incapacity, body infirmity or other cause.
3. Compensable injury shall be established by objective medical evidence.
4. An employee has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she suffered a compensable injury.
5. Benefits shall not be payable for condition which results from a non-work-related independent intervening cause following a compensable injury which prolongs disability, aggravation or requires treatment.

#### B. Consequential injury:

1. Injury or harm to a part of the body that is a direct result of the injury or medical treatment to the body part originally injured in the claim.

#### C. Cumulative trauma:

1. The combined effect of repetitive physical activities expending over a period of time in the course and scope of claimant's employment. Cumulative trauma shall have resulted directly and independently of all other causes. There is no minimum time of employment or injurious exposure requirement for a compensable injury.

### **III. NOTICE - (85A O.S. §§ 67-68):**

#### **A. Cumulative Trauma and Occupational Disease Notice:**

1. Written notice must be given to the employer of occupational disease or cumulative trauma by the employee within six (6) months after first distinct manifestation of disease or cumulative trauma or within six (6) months after death.

#### **B. Single Event Notice:**

1. Unless an employee gives oral or written notice to the employer within 30 days of the date the injury occurs, there will be a rebuttable presumption that the injury is not work related.

#### **C. Rebuttable Presumption:**

1. Unless an employee gives oral or written notice to the employer within 30 days of the employee's separation from employment, there is a rebuttable presumption that the occupational disease or cumulative trauma did not arise out of or in the course of the employment.

### **IV. EMPLOYER'S NOTICE TO THE COMMISSION (85A O.S. § 63):**

#### **A. Within ten days of the date of receipt of notice or knowledge of injury or death, the employer must send the Commission a report providing factual information regarding the parties and injury.**

1. CC – FORM 2

### **V. CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION – (85A O.S. § 111(A)):**

#### **A. Any claim for any benefit under this Act is commenced with the filing of an Employee's First Notice of Claim for Compensation by the employee with the Workers' Compensation Commission.**

1. CC – FORM 3

### **VI. EMPLOYER'S ACCEPTANCE OR CONTROVERSION OF CLAIM – (85A O.S. § 111(B)):**

#### **A. If an employer controverts any issue related to the Employee's First Notice of Claim for Compensation, the employer must file a Notice of Contested Issues on a form prescribed by the Commission.**

1. CC – FORM 2A – Not required to be submitted

### **VII. MEDICAL TREATMENT - (85A O.S. § 50):**

#### **A. The employer has the right to choose the treating physician or chiropractor.**

#### **B. If the employer fails or neglects to provide medical treatment within five days after actual knowledge is received of the injury, the employee may select the treating physician at the expense of the employer.**

#### **C. Diagnostic testing shall not be performed shorter than six months from the date of the last test without good cause shown.**

#### **D. Unless recommended by a treating physician, chiropractor, or an independent medical examiner, continued medical maintenance should not be awarded by the Commission.**

- E. An employee claiming benefits under this Act shall submit him/herself to medical examination, otherwise rights and benefits shall be suspended.
- F. Mileage is reimbursed to the claimant for mileage in excess of 20 miles not to exceed 600 miles.
- G. Payment for medical care as required by this Act is due within 45 days of receipt by the employer or insurance carrier of a completed and accurate invoice unless there is a good faith reason to request additional information. Thereafter, the Commission may assess a penalty of up to 25% of any amount due under the fee schedule that remains unpaid on the finding by Commission that no good faith existed for the delay. A pattern of willfully and knowingly delaying payments can result in a civil penalty of not more than \$5,000.00.
- H. If an employee misses a scheduled appointment with a physician or chiropractor, the employer's insurance company shall pay the physician or chiropractor a reasonable charge determined by the Commission for the missed appointment. In absence of a good faith reason for missing the appointment, the Commission shall have the employee reimburse the employer and insurance carrier.

#### **VIII. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION – (85A O.S. § 45):**

- A. An injured employee who is eligible for permanent partial disability under this section is entitled to receive vocational rehabilitation services. Vocational rehabilitation services and training shall not exceed a period of 52 weeks.
- B. On application of either party or by order of an ALJ, the Vocational Rehabilitation Director shall assist the Commission to determine if it is appropriate for a claimant to receive vocational rehabilitation services. If appropriate, the ALJ can refer the employee for an evaluation. The cost of evaluation shall be paid by the employer. If following the evaluation, the employee refuses services, or training ordered by the ALJ, or fails to make a good faith attempt in vocational rehabilitation, the cost of the evaluation and services or training may, in the discretion of the ALJ, be deducted from any remaining PPD award.
- C. Request for vocational services must be filed within 60 days of permanent restrictions.
- D. If retraining requires residence away from employee's residence, reasonable room, board, tuition, and books shall be paid.
- E. If the employee is actively and in good faith participating in a retraining program to determine permanent total disability, he may be entitled to 52 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, plus all tuition and vocational services. The employer or employer's insurance carrier may deduct the amount paid in tuition from compensation awarded to the employee.

## **IX. AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE – (85A O.S. 59):**

- A. Average weekly wage is determined by dividing the gross wages by the number of weeks of employment for maximum of 52 weeks.
- B. If an injured employee works for wages by the job, the average weekly wage is determined by dividing the earnings of the employee by the number of hours required to earn the wage, then multiplying the hourly rate by the number of hours in a full-time work week for employment.

## **X. DISABILITY BENEFITS**

- A. Temporary Total Disability (85A O.S. § 45/ §62) If the injured worker is temporarily unable to perform his job or any alternative work, he is entitled to receive compensation equal to 70% of his average weekly wage.
  - 1. Maximum TTD is 156 weeks.
  - 2. TTD is not paid for the first three (3) days of the initial period of TTD.
  - 3. TTD shall not exceed 8 weeks for nonsurgical soft tissue injuries regardless of the number of body parts.
    - a. If a claimant receives an injection or injections, they should be entitled to additional 8 weeks of TTD.
    - b. Injection shall not include facet injections or IV injections.
  - 4. If there is a surgical recommendation the injured employee can be entitled to an additional 16 weeks of TTD. If the surgery is not performed within 30 days of approval by the employer's insurance carrier and the delay is caused by the employee acting in bad faith, the benefits for the extended period shall be terminated and reimbursed all TTD beyond 8 weeks.
  - 5. Soft tissue includes but is not limited to sprains, strains, contusion, tendinitis and muscle tears. Cumulative trauma is considered soft tissue unless corrective surgery is necessary.
    - a. Soft tissue does not include injury or disease to the spine, disks, nerves or spinal cord where corrective surgery is performed, many brain or closed head injuries as evidenced by sensory or motor disturbance, communication disturbance, disturbances of cerebral function, neurological disorders or other brain and closed head injuries at least as severe in nature as above, and any joint replacement.
  - 6. If the Administrative Law Judge finds a consequential injury, the claimant may receive an additional period of 52 weeks of TTD; such finding shall be by clear and convincing evidence.
  - 7. If the employee is released by the treating physician for all body parts, misses three (3) consecutive medical treatment appointments without valid excuse, fails to comply with medical orders of the treating physician or abandons care, the employer may terminate TTD by giving notice to the employee or their counsel.
  - 8. If employee objects to termination of TTD, the Commission shall set a hearing within 20 days to determine if TTD should be reinstated.

9. If otherwise qualified according to the provisions of this act, PTD benefits may be awarded to an employee who has exhausted the maximum TTD even though the employee has not reached MMI.
10. Benefits under this subsection shall be permanently terminated by order of the Commission if the employee is noncompliant or abandons treatment for sixty (60) days, or if benefits under this subsection have been suspended under this paragraph at least two times.
11. An employee who is incarcerated shall not be eligible to receive temporary total disability benefits under this title. Any medical benefits available to an incarcerated employee shall be limited by other provisions of this title in the same manner as for all injured employees.

B. Temporary partial disability (85A O.S. § 45):

1. If claimant is only able to work part-time, he can receive the greater of 70% of the difference between the pre-injury average weekly wage and the weekly wage for performing alternative work, but only if his or her weekly wage in performing the alternative work is less than the TTD rate.
2. If the employee refuses alternative work, they are not entitled to temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits.
3. TPD benefits are limited to 52 weeks.

C. Permanent Partial Disability (85A O.S. § 45-46):

1. Permanent Partial Disability may not exceed 100% of the body part or body as a whole. (The language indicating that surgical body parts are not included is no longer in the Workers' Compensation Act)
2. A physician's opinion of the nature and extent of permanent partial disability benefits to parts of the body other than scheduled members, must be based solely on criteria established under the 6<sup>th</sup> Edition of the AMA Guides. All parties may submit a report from an evaluating physician.
3. Permanent disability should not be allowed to a body part for which no medical treatment has been received.
4. Permanent partial disability shall be 70% of the average weekly wage, not to exceed \$360.00 per week for injuries on or after July 1, 2021 through December 31, 2024.
5. Maximum permanent disability is 360 weeks to the body as a whole.
6. In the event there exists a previous PPD, including non-work-related injury or condition which produces PPD and the same is aggravated or accelerated by an accidental personal injury or occupational disease, compensation for PPD shall be only for such amount as was caused by such accidental personal injury or occupational disease and no additional compensation shall be allowed for the pre-existing PPD or impairment.
7. An employee cannot receive payment on two permanent partial disability orders at the same time.
8. Permanent partial disability for amputation or permanent total loss of a scheduled member shall be paid regardless of whether or not claimant returns to work in his/her pre-injury or equivalent job.

D. Permanent Total Disability (85A O.S. § 45):

1. 70% of the average weekly wage not to exceed the maximum TTD rate for the DOA.
2. Benefits are payable until claimant reaches the age maximum of social security retirement benefits or for period of 15 years, whichever is longer.
3. If claimant dies of causes unrelated to the injury or illness, benefits cease on the date of death.
4. Any person entitled to revive the claim shall receive a one-time lump sum payment equal to 26 weeks of permanent total disability benefits.
5. In the event the Commission awards both permanent partial disability and permanent total disability, permanent total disability does not start until permanent partial disability benefits have been paid in full.
6. Permanent total disability benefits may be awarded to an employee who has exhausted the maximum period of temporary total disability even though the employee has not reached MMI.
7. The Commission shall annually review the status of an employee receiving permanent total disability benefits against the last employer and shall require the employee to file an affidavit noting that he/she has not returned to gainful employment and is not able to return to gainful employment. Failure to file the affidavit shall result in suspension of benefits which can be reinstated.
8. Benefits for a single event injury are determined by the law in effect at the time of the injury. Benefits for cumulative trauma or occupational disease or illness are determined by the law in effect at the time the employee knew or reasonably should have known of the injury. Benefits for death are determined at the time of death.

E. Disfigurement (85A O.S. § 45):

1. Maximum disfigurement is \$50,000.00.
2. No award for disfigurement shall be entered until 12 months from the injury unless the treating physician deems the wound or incision to be fully healed.

F. Revivor of PPD(85A O.S. §71 (E)):

1. No compensation for disability of an injured employee shall be payable for any period beyond his or her death; provided, however if an injured employee is awarded compensation for permanent partial disability by final order and then dies, a reviver action may be brought by the injured employee's spouse, child or children under disability as defined in Section 67 but limited to the number of weeks of disability awarded to the injured employee minus the number of weeks of benefits paid for the PPD to the injured worker at the time of the death of the injured employee. An award of compensation for PPD may be made after the death of the injured employee. Such reviver action may be brought only by the injured employee's spouse, minor child or children under Section 67.



## **XI. DEATH BENEFITS - (85A O.S. § 47):**

- A. If death does not arise within one year from the date of accident or within the first three years of the period for compensation payments fixed by the compensation judgment, a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the death did not result from the injury.
- B. A Common law spouse shall not be entitled to benefits unless he/she obtains an order from the Commission ruling that a common-law marriage existed. The Commission's ruling shall be exclusive regardless of any district court decision.
- C. A surviving spouse is entitled to a lump sum payment of \$100,000.00, weekly checks at 70% of the average weekly wage, and a 2-year indemnity benefit upon remarriage.
- D. Children get \$25,000.00 lump sum and 15% of the average weekly wage up to two children. If more than two children they divide \$50,000.00 equally and split 30% of the average weekly wage equally. If there are children but no surviving spouse, each child receives \$25,000.00 and 50% of the average weekly wage goes to each child. If more than two children, this is split equally, not to exceed \$150,000.00 maximum lump sum benefit.
- E. Funeral expenses shall not exceed \$10,000.00.

## **XII. SUBROGATION**

- A. Primary Contractor Liability (85A O.S. § 36):
  - 1. If a subcontractor fails to secure compensation required by this Act, the primary contractor shall be liable for compensation to the employees of the subcontractor unless there is an intermediate subcontractor who has workers' compensation coverage. In this event the primary contractor would have a cause of action against the subcontractor to recover compensation paid.
- B. Third Party Liability (85A O.S. § 43):
  - 1. The making of a claim for compensation against an employer or carrier for injury or death by an employee, shall not affect the right of the employee to have a cause of action against a third party.
  - 2. The employer or employer's carrier shall be entitled to reasonable notice and opportunity to join the third party action.
  - 3. If the employer or carrier join the third party action for injury or death, they shall be entitled to a first lien of 2/3 of the net proceeds recovered in the action that remain after payment of reasonable cost of collection.
  - 4. An employer or carrier, liable for compensation under this act shall have the right to maintain an Action in Tort against any third party responsible for injury or death; however, the employer or carrier shall notify the claimant in writing that the claimant has right to hire a private attorney and pursue benefits.

### **XIII. PROCEDURE**

#### **A. Workers' Compensation Commission Proceedings (85A O.S. § 72):**

1. In making investigation or inquiry or conducting a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge and Commission shall not be bound by technical or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure except provided by this Act.
2. Hearings to be Public – Records.
  - a. Hearings before the Commission shall be open to the public and shall be stenographically reported. The Commission is authorized to contract for the reporting of the hearings.
  - b. The Commission shall, by rule, provide for the preparation of a record of all hearings and other proceedings before it.
  - c. The Commission shall not be required to stenographically report or prepare a record of joint petition hearings. (Editor's note: The joint petition record has always been used to protect the employer as to the terms of the joint petition. It would be my recommendation to continue making a record for joint petitions so all parties are clear about the terms of the settlement and the rights the claimant is waiving.)
  - d. All oral and documentary evidence shall be presented to the ALJ during the initial hearing on a controverted claim. Medical reports shall be furnished to opposing party at least 7 days prior to the hearing. Witness shall be exchanged 7 days prior to hearing.
  - e. Expert testimony should not be allowed unless it satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of Evidence 702.

#### **B. Workers' Compensation Commission Powers (85A O.S. § 73):**

1. The Commission shall have the power to preserve and enforce order during any proceeding before it, issue subpoenas, administer oaths and compel attendance and testimony as well as production of documents. Any person or party failing to take the oath, attend, produce documents or comply with final judgment of Administrative Law Judge or Commission or willfully refuses to pay uncontroverted medical or related expenses within 45 days can be held in contempt and fined up to \$10,000.00.

#### **C. Appeals (85A O.S. § 78):**

1. Any party feeling aggrieved by a judgment decision or award made by Administrative Law Judge may within 10 days of issuance appeal to the Workers' Compensation Commission. The Commission may reverse, modify or affirm the decision that was against the clear weight of evidence or contrary to law.
2. The judgment decision or award of the Commission shall be final and conclusive on all questions within its jurisdiction between the parties unless an action is commenced with the Supreme Court within 20 days of the award or decision.

D. Certification to District Court (85A O.S. § 79):

1. If an employee fails to comply with final compensation judgment or award, any beneficiary may file a certified copy of the judgment or award in the office of the district court of any county in this state where any property of the employer may be found.

E. Workers' Compensation Commission – Limited Review of Compensation Judgment (85A O.S. § 80):

1. Except in the case of joint petition settlement, the Commission may review a compensation judgment, award or decision any time within six (6) months of termination of the compensation fixed in the original compensation judgment or award on the Commission's own motion or application of either party, on the ground of a change of physical condition or on proof of erroneous wage rate. On review, the Commission may make judgment or award terminating, continuing, decreasing or increasing the compensation previously awarded subject to the maximum limits provided for this in Act.

#### **XIV. DEFENSES**

A. "Course and scope of employment" (85A O.S. §2(13)): Injury must derive from an activity of any kind or character for which the employee was hired and that relates to and derives from the work, business, trade or profession of an employer, and is performed by an employee in the furtherance of the affairs or business of an employer. The term includes activities conducted on the premises of an employer or at other locations designated by an employer and travel by an employee in furtherance of the affairs of an employer that is specifically directed by the employer. This term does not include:

1. An employee's transportation to and from his or her place of employment,
2. Travel by an employee in furtherance of the affairs of an employer if the travel is also in furtherance of personal or private affairs of the employee,
3. Any injury occurring in a parking lot or other common area adjacent to an employer's place of business before the employee clocks in or otherwise begins work for the employer or after the employee clocks out or otherwise stops work for the employer unless the employer owns or maintains exclusive control over the area, or
4. Any injury occurring while an employee is on a work break, unless the injury occurs while the employee is on a work break inside the employer's facility or in an area owned by or exclusively controlled by the employer and the work break is authorized by the employer's supervisor.

B. Injury to any active participant in assaults or combats which, although they may occur in the workplace, are the result of non-employment-related hostility or animus of one, both, or all of the combatants and which assault or combat amounts to a deviation from customary duties; provided, however, injuries caused by horseplay shall not be considered to be compensable injuries, except for innocent victims (85A O.S. §2(9)(b)(1)).

- C. Injury incurred while engaging in or performing or as the result of engaging in or performing any recreational or social activities for the employee's personal pleasure (85A O.S. §2(9)(b)(2)),
- D. Injury which was inflicted on the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed or before the employee was hired or after the employment relationship was terminated(85A O.S. §2(9)(b)(3)),
- E. Intoxication - Injury where the accident was caused by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of physician's orders (85A O.S. §2(9)(b)(4)). If a biological specimen is collected within twenty-four (24) hours of the employee being injured or reporting an injury, or if at any time after the injury a biological specimen is collected by the Oklahoma Office of the Chief Medical Examiner if the injured employee does not survive for at least twenty-four (24) hours after the injury, and the employee tests positive for intoxication, an illegal controlled substance, or a legal controlled substance used in contravention to a treating physician's orders, or refuses to undergo the drug and alcohol testing, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the injury was caused by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of physician's orders. This presumption may only be overcome if the employee proves by clear and convincing evidence that his or her state of intoxication had no causal relationship to the injury.
- F. Major Cause - Any strain, degeneration, damage or harm to, or disease or condition of, the eye or musculoskeletal structure or other body part resulting from the natural results of aging, osteoarthritis, arthritis, or degenerative process including, but not limited to, degenerative joint disease, degenerative disc disease, degenerative spondylosis/spondylolisthesis and spinal stenosis (85A O.S. §2(9)(b)(5)).
  - 1. "Major cause" means more than fifty percent (50%) of the resulting injury, disease, or illness. A finding of major cause shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence. A finding that the workplace was not a major cause of the injury, disease or illness shall not adversely affect the exclusive remedy provisions of this Act and shall not create a separate cause of action outside this Act
- G. Preexisting condition - except when the treating physician clearly confirms an identifiable and significant aggravation incurred in the course and scope of employment (85A O.S. §2(9)(b)(6)).
- H. Mental Injury or Illness (85A O.S. § 13):
  - 1. A mental injury or illness is not a compensable injury unless caused by a physical injury to the employee, and shall not be considered an injury arising out of and in the course and scope of employment or compensable unless demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
    - a. Physical injury limitation shall not apply to any victim of a crime of violence, law enforcement officer, paid or volunteer firefighter, or emergency technician who suffers PTSD while responding to an emergency.
  - 2. No mental injury or illness under this section shall be compensable unless it is also diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and unless the diagnosis of

the condition meets the criteria established in the most current issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.

3. Where a claim is for mental injury or illness, the employee shall be limited to twenty-six (26) weeks of disability benefits unless it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that benefits should continue for a set period of time, not to exceed a total of fifty-two (52) weeks.
4. In cases where a first responder receives benefits for a mental injury or illness with no physical injury who, after reaching MMI, is unable to perform the essential functions of his employment position and who is not eligible to receive disability retirement through his pension or retirement system shall be eligible to be awarded permanent disability not to exceed \$50,000.
5. In cases where death results directly from the mental injury or illness within a period of one (1) year, compensation shall be paid to the dependents as provided in other death cases under this act.
  - a. Death directly or indirectly related to the mental injury or illness occurring one (1) year or more from the incident resulting in the mental injury or illness shall not be a compensable injury.

I. Heart claims (85A O.S. § 14):

1. A cardiovascular, coronary, pulmonary, respiratory, or cerebrovascular accident or myocardial infarction causing injury, illness, or death is a compensable injury only if, in relation to other factors contributing to the physical harm, the course and scope of employment was the major cause.
2. An injury or disease included in subsection A of this section shall not be deemed to be a compensable injury unless it is shown that the exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the disability or death was extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the employee's usual work in the course of the employee's regular employment, or that some unusual and unpredicted incident occurred which is found to have been the major cause of the physical harm.

J. Notice - (85A O.S. § 67-68)

1. Single event Notice – Unless an employee gives oral or written notice to the employer within 30 days of the date of injury occurs, there will be a rebuttable presumption that the injury is not work related.
2. Cumulative/Occupational Notice – written notice must be given to the employer of occupational disease or cumulative trauma by the employee within 6 months after the first distinct manifestation of the disease or cumulative trauma. Unless an employee gives oral or written notice to the employer within thirty (30) days of the employee's separation from employment, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that an occupational disease or cumulative trauma injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Such presumption must be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence.

K. Statute of Limitations – (85A O.S. § 69):

1. Other than occupational disease, a claim for benefits under this Act shall be barred unless it is filed with the Commission within one year from the date of injury or within 6 months from the date of the last issuance of benefits. A claim for occupational disease or occupational infection shall be barred unless it is filed within two years from the date of last injurious exposure.
2. A claim for compensation for disability on account of silicosis or asbestosis shall be filed with the Commission one (1) year after the time of disablement and the disablement shall occur within three (3) years from the last date of injurious exposure.
3. A claim for compensation for death benefits shall be barred unless it is filed within two (2) years from the date of death.
4. If a claim for benefits has been timely filed and the employee does not: A) make a good-faith request for a hearing to resolve a dispute regarding the right to receive benefits, including medical treatment, under this title within six (6) months of the date the claim is filed, or B) receive or seek benefits, including medical treatment, under this title for a period of six (6) months, then on motion by the employer, the claim shall be dismissed with prejudice.
5. Replacement of medical supplies or prosthetics shall not toll the statute of limitations.
6. Failure to file a claim within the period prescribed in subsection A of this section shall not be a bar to the right to benefits hereunder unless objection to the failure is made at the first hearing on the claim in which all parties in interest have been given a reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard by the Commission.
7. Any claimant may, upon the payment of the Workers' Compensation Commission's filing fee, dismiss any claim brought by the claimant at any time before final submission of the case to the Commission for decision. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice unless the words "with prejudice" are included in the order. If any claim that is filed within the statutory time permitted by Section 18 of this Act is dismissed without prejudice, a new claim may be filed within one (1) year after the entry of the order dismissing the first claim even if the statutory time for filing has expired.

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## RECENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS IN OKLAHOMA FROM ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RECENT OKLAHOMA CASES

**Q. Does a co-employee receive protections under the Exclusive Remedy Provision if their conduct does not arise within the course and scope of employment?**

**A. No.** In *Bayouth v. Dewberry*, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a coworker is entitled to the protections of the exclusive remedy provision in the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act when their conduct arises within the course and scope of employment.

In this case, Employee A went to the office of Employee B and shot Employee B with a gun. Employee A was not working that day, i.e. had a day off. Employee B was paid indemnity benefits from the carrier of his employer. Employee B then filed a petition for the negligence of Employee A and his actions in causing the injury. The estate of Employee A filed a motion for summary judgment stating that since Employee B received indemnity benefits from his employer, he was not entitled to bring a third-party negligence against a coworker. The motion further stated that no exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision applied. Employee B responded by alleging that the actions of a coworker must meet the "co-employee immunity test," and since Employee B was off duty that day, his actions did not meet this standard.

In writing the majority opinion, Justice Combs held that a coworker is entitled to the protections of the exclusive remedy provision only when their alleged hurtful conduct arises within the course and scope of employment. Further, the definition of course and scope of employment, 85A O.S. §2(13), does not provide protection to an employee 24/7, but instead has areas and times where the employee is not protected when their actions are for personal matters or for actions not under the guise of work or employment.

Although the court did not determine whether the specific actions of Employee A were within the course and scope of employment, the court did make a correction to the interpretation of law. Not only must the injured employee be within the course and scope of employment to receive benefits, but also the coworker must be within the course and scope of employment to receive protections under the exclusive remedy provision.

*Bayouth v. Dewberry*, 2024 OK 42

**Q. Can an employer be liable for both a workers' compensation claim and a common-law negligence claim?**

**A. No.** In a recent decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that an employer or contractor cannot use an indemnity clause to move their liability to another employer that is already liable under a workers' compensation claim.

Plaintiff is the widow of decedent who was a contracted employee for BJ's Oilfield Construction, Inc. ("BJ's"). Oklahoma Gas and Electric ("OG&E") contracted with SunPower Corporation Systems ("SunPower") for a solar power facility. SunPower contracted with Moss & Associates ("Moss") who then subcontracted with BJ's. Decedent

died while working at the construction site due to a fellow employee's use of a machinery. Plaintiff filed for and received Oklahoma workers' compensation benefits. Plaintiff later filed a wrongful death claim in district court alleging SunPower, Moss, and OG&E were negligent in maintaining the construction site. BJ's was also included as a defendant in this action. SunPower created an indemnity agreement with Moss which would move liability from SunPower to Moss. This language was extended to the contract between Moss and BJ's. This in turn would create liability on behalf of BJ's in the place of SunPower if a claim were to arise. SunPower argued that this language protected it from any liability arising from this incident. BJ's moved to dismiss this claim because no right to or contractual language for indemnity existed. The trial court granted BJ's motion to dismiss without stating the grounds for the grant.

In the majority opinion, Justice Edmondson held that the liability of SunPower cannot be placed on BJ's through an indemnity clause because BJ's was already liable to the Plaintiff through worker's compensation claims. Justice Edmondson stated that the Legislature has the power to limit the scope of contractual agreements between parties and did so with respect to liability of multiple parties under 85A O.S. §5. Justice Edmondson held that the language of §5 does not allow one employer to be liable for both a worker's compensation claim and a third-party common-law negligence claim for the same physical injury. An indemnity clause within a contract fails if the party taking liability has already been held liable either under workers' compensation or under a common-law negligence claim for the same physical injury. This restricts the ability of claimants to double dip in awards from a single party and instead pushes them to bring claims against other parties involved for claims arising out of the same physical injury.

Justice Edmondson stated that the mandatory language of 85A O.S. §5 cannot be waived through a contract creating a new legal relationship between employees and employers in regard to liability under workers' compensation and common-law negligence claims for the same physical injury. Due to the liability of BJ's for workers' compensation benefits, it is not liable in any sense for the common-law negligence claim for the same physical injury.

*Knox v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company, 2024 OK 37*

**Q. *Is a Claimant restricted by the exclusive remedy provision in the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act when the PPD 350-week limit has been exceeded at the time of the latest injury?***

**A. Maybe (still pending).** The Oklahoma Administrative Workers' Compensation Act limits lifetime awards to permanent partial disability (PPD) for an injured worker to 350 weeks. That provision is moving toward an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision on (1) the constitutionality of the limit on the number of weeks of PPD and (2) the loss of exclusive remedy for the employer if the 350-week limit has been exceeded at the time of the latest injury.

In *Cantwell v. Flex-N-Gate*, the claimant sustained numerous injuries while employed for Flex-N-Gate over a 28-year period. His employment spanned the 2014 law changes,



bringing up this challenge of whether a claimant is entitled to 100% impairment to any body part of body as a whole or if a claimant is only entitled to 350 weeks pre-February 1, 2014/ 360 weeks post February 1, 2014.

Justice Gurich of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, writing the majority opinion, stated that when conflicting measurements of awards are at issue, such as weeks and percentages in this case, the more consistent one should be relied on. In this case, Justice Gurich holds that the PPD percentages are more consistent and should be used to determine the eligibility of a claimant to receive PPD over weeks which change regularly through statutes.

Justice Gurich cited the case of *Rivas v. Parkland Manor*, 2000 OK 68, in which the Court held that a claimant does not get the option of the more liberal remedy when receiving PPD so long as the remedies are not arbitrary and apply “evenhandedly to all claimants.” Justice Gurich stated that going against this ruling, even though the applicable statutes have changed, would be impermissible and unconstitutional due to the uneven cap placed on different claimants under the same statutes.

Justice Kuehn of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, writing the dissenting opinion, states that the percentages and week measurements can be read effectively together to create a fair representation of the benefits that an individual is eligible to receive. Further, she states that the Legislature accounted for this issue of previous PPD percentages in 85A O.S. §45(C)(6)(a) by stating these pre-existing percentages should be accounted for in calculations and eligibility of benefits.

This case has been remanded for further findings and holdings based on the ruling of the majority.

*Cantwell v. Flex-N-Gate*, 2023 OK 116

**Q. What are the requirements to bring an occupational disease claim? What are the appellate review standards?**

- A. In *Exterran Holdings v. Abonza*, claimant Abonza was diagnosed with silicosis after working as a sandblaster. The timing of the filing of his occupational disease claim was disputed. The Commission reversed the ALJ’s decision, denying compensation as it was against the clear weight of the evidence. After the Commission’s decision, Exterran Holdings appealed. The Court then determined the standard of review as described in 85A O.S. §78(c), which states that a judgment of the Commission shall be final, and an appeal shall stay any decision and award until the appeal rights have been waived or exhausted. The Supreme Court can modify, reverse, or remand the decision for any one of the 8 reasons listed such as for a violation of constitutional provisions, unlawful procedure, error of law, fraud, arbitrary, etc.

Mr. Abonza worked as a sandblaster and painter for eight years and quit working for the employer on September 24, 2015, due to fatigue and difficulty breathing. After being diagnosed with silicosis and interstitial lung disease, he filed two claims for compensation alleging occupational disease and cumulative trauma. Claimant filed the claims in the Court of Existing Claims, which were dismissed as the CEC did not have jurisdiction. The claims were then brought before the Workers’ Compensation Commission, the appropriate venue.

Different occupational diseases named under Title 85A have different requirements for timely filing. Under 85A O.S. §69(A)(2)(a), an occupational disease or infection must be filed within two years from the date of the last “injurious exposure to the hazards of the disease or infection.” Within this, claims for diseases such as silicosis or asbestosis must be filed within one year after disablement and the disablement must be within three years of the last injurious exposure. For radiation exposure the claim must be filed within two years from when the condition is made known to the employee after an examination by a doctor.

*Exterran Holdings, Inc. v. Abonza*, 2023 OK CIV APP 33

**Q: Must a claimant file a claim for compensation before the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Commission before one year to defeat the Statute of Limitation?**

**A. Maybe.** In *Schumberger Technology Corp. v. Paredes*, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that an injured worker in Oklahoma has **at least** one year from the date of an injury in which to file his or her claim.

In *Paredes*, the Court interpreted 85A O.S. Sec. 69, “[a] claim...shall be barred unless it is filed...within one (1) year from the date of injury or, if the employee has received benefits under this title for injury, six (6) months from the date of the last issuance of benefits” finding the Legislature intended for injured workers to have **at least one year** from the date of an injury in which to file a workers’ compensation claim before the Workers’ Compensation Commission.

The employer’s insurance company admitted the injury and voluntarily provided treatment for two months. A Form 3 was filed 10 months after the accident, well within the one-year SOL. However, the insurance carrier denied the claim, alleging that the SOL was only 8 months. The ALJ and the Commission en Banc ruled that the SOL was at least one year. The carrier appealed and the Supreme Court retained the appeal.

Justice Gurich opined the Legislature had created a method to extend payment of benefits beyond an arbitrary SOL, noting that “Commission’s decision applied the statute as intended, which was to give the claimant the benefit of the longer period because of the employer’s payment of benefits... the phrase ‘whichever is greater’ is superfluous.”

The opinion also holds that the SOL is “not an absolute time bar.” The burden is on the employer to take affirmative action. There must not only be an objection based upon the running of the SOL, but **ALSO A HEARING**.

The six months provision of Sec. 69 only extends the SOL in cases in which the employer admits the injury and pays benefits. If a badly injured worker is off four years when treatment is terminated, he or she has six months from that date to file a claim before the Commission.

*Schumberger Technology Corp. v. Paredes*, 2023 OK 42.

**Q: May a doctor consider a claimant's expression of pain and take it into account when determining the cause of an injury to meet the "objective findings" standard for an injury?**

**A: Yes.** In *Pilot Travel Centers v. Stephens*, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found a doctor may consider a claimant's expression of pain when determining the cause of an injury to meet the "objective findings" standard for an injury found in 85A O.S. Sec. 2(9)(c).

The decision emphasizes that subsection of the statute only prohibits consideration of expressions of pain **under the voluntary control of the patient**. However, if pain is found during a physical manipulation, the doctor's opinion that an injury has occurred is "objective medical evidence under the statute."

Respondent argued to the Court that an IME's report was not competent objective evidence of injury because it was based entirely (so they claimed) on Claimant's expressions of pain, in opposition to the statute. However, the Court emphasized an expression of pain may **voluntary or involuntary**.

In this case, the IME doctor conducted physical manipulation of Claimant and determined she had "pain with motion." The Court stated, the doctor may then consider, consistent with statute, the expression of pain made during physical examination, and the opinion resulting IS objective medical evidence.

In *Stephens*, the Court also found considered opinions of doctors at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine and quoted language in their opinion in defining a rhizotomy as "a minimally invasive **SURGERY**."

*Pilot Travel Centers v. Brenda Stephens, OK Supreme Court Case No. 119,260.*

**Q: May a claimant maintain an Intentional Tort claim in district court at the same time as a Workers' Compensation claim?**

**A: No.** In *Kpiele-Poda v. Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc.*, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that 85A O.S. Sec. 5(l) unambiguously permits an employee to maintain an action **either** before the Commission or in district court, **but not both**.

In *Patterson-UTI Energy*, the injured employee suffered injuries to his legs and lower back while repairing a conveyor at a wellsite. He filed a workers' compensation claim, and while that claim was still pending, filed a petition asserting negligence and products liability in district court against employer, two wellsite operators, and manufacturers and distributors of conveyor.

Employee's employers moved to dismiss the district court action arguing the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act and Oklahoma precedent preclude employees from simultaneously maintaining an action before the Workers' Compensation Commission and in the district court. The district court granted each dismissal motion and certified each order as appealable.

The worker appealed the dismissal order and the Supreme Court held the district court properly dismissed Employee's intentional tort action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the pending claim before the Commission.

Therefore, because the employee invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission first, by filing the workers' compensation claim, and maintained the action in that forum, he is statutorily prohibited from maintaining simultaneous action in district court, and the district court matter must be dismissed.

*Kpiele-Poda v. Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc.*, 2023 OK 11.

**Q. *Is a Claimant who undergoes surgery for a compensable hernia injury also entitled to disfigurement benefits?***

**A. No.** 85A O.S. §61(B)(1) states the specific hernia benefits, six weeks of TTD benefits, which control and supersede the benefits set for in Title 85A. In *Houck v. Oklahoma City Public Schools*, claimant Houck received a hernia after lifting a hood on a bus. He received 6 weeks of TTD pursuant to 85A O.S. §61. Claimant argued that he was entitled to disfigurement benefits due to the hernia repairment surgery, which was disputed by the Employer who stated that §61 precluded his ability to receive disfigurement under 85A O.S. §45(F)(1).

The court, using plain language of the 85A O.S. §61(B)(1), determined that the intent of the legislature was for §61 to preclude the ability of a claimant to receive benefits under both §61 and §45. The Court stated that “notwithstanding,” which means “despite” or “in spite of” in Black’s Law Dictionary, shows that the Legislature intended for hernias to be completely regulated under §61 whether a claimant received a surgery or not. The court cited to *Graham v. D & K Oilfield Services, Inc.*, 2017 OK 72, in which the court held the Legislature has the power to limit the ability of recovery for specific body parts and ailments. Further it stated, injuries such as hernias have been limited since workers’ compensation was established in Oklahoma.

*Houch v. Oklahoma City Public Schools*, 2023 OK CIV APP 27

**Q: *If a Claimant unsuccessfully recovers workers’ compensation benefits for an injury, can he then file suit in trial court and plead a claim for relief that is legally possible if an employer may have assumed the duty to provide a safer crosswalk for access to an employer designated parking lot?***

**A. Yes.** In *Harwood v. Ardagh Group, Ardagh Glass, Inc.*, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the employer may have assumed the duty to provide a safer crosswalk for access to the employer designated parking lot and therefore, the employee pled a case for relief which was legally possible. The trial court’s decision was premature and the question of whether the actions of the employer were the proximate cause of the employee’s injuries is a matter for a jury to decide.

In *Harwood*, the Plaintiff was struck by Defendant's automobile while leaving his work shift and attempting to cross a state highway to an employer provided parking lot. Plaintiff attempted to recover workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries but was not successful since he was not injured “in the course of employment.” Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against his employer and the Defendant driver. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit against the employer for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals confirmed the decision.

Plaintiff argued that Defendant caused his injuries when he negligently failed to stop at the crosswalk and that his employer was also a cause of his injuries because the employer negligently failed to ensure adequate lighting and protection for employees crossing at the crosswalk. The employer argued that it did not have a duty to make the crosswalk safer because it did not own, operate, or control the crosswalk and because Plaintiff was not within the course and scope of employment at the time of the accident.

The Court notes that while Plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits were denied, a workers' compensation analysis is still useful in this case. Here, Plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits were denied because his injuries were not within the "course and scope of employment." However, negligence for a parking lot or crosswalk injury can be covered under tort law. The Court agrees that if there is an actionable claim for negligence in Plaintiff's case, it is covered by tort law rather than workers' compensation law and may be brought in the district court. Denial of workers' compensation benefits does not preclude such an action.

Plaintiff alleges several facts to make the argument that the employer had a duty of care. The employer provided parking for employees and instructed them to park across a busy highway. The employer stated it would make crossing the highway as safe as possible and took certain precautions such as creating a walkway with railings and placing strobe lights on the four-way stop when the crosswalk lights were out. Because the employer had previously taken steps to make the crossing safer, the employees relied on the employer to make the crossing safe, and the employer failed to do so on this occasion which increased the risk of harm to Plaintiff. Under these facts, the Court held that the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted was premature.

*Harwood v. Ardagh Group, Ardagh Glass, Inc.*, 2022 OK 51.

**Q. *Is an employer protected by the exclusive remedy provision of the Oklahoma Administrative Workers' Compensation Act when a Claimant asserts a claim for benefits in another state?***

**A. No**, In *Whited v. Parish*, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has refused to accept original jurisdiction of a Creek County case in which the district judge allowed a wrongful death action and an intentional tort against the employer to continue. The district judge ruled that the employer was not protected by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Oklahoma Administrative Workers' Compensation Act even though workers' compensation benefits were paid in Minnesota.

Justice Gurich of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in a concurring decision, distinguished this case from *Farley v. City of Claremore*, 2020 OK 30, in which the direct action against the employer was not allowed because there was an Oklahoma workers' compensation case that had been carried to conclusion.

Justice Gurich cited the case of *Whipple v. Phillips & Sons Trucking*, 2020 OK 75, in which the Court held that the parents of an unmarried employee without children could proceed in a direct action against the employer because the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act provided no benefits.

Finally, Justice Gurich opined, "[I]acking an Oklahoma workers' compensation remedy, the Creek County district court action brought by the [personal representative], is not precluded by the exclusive remedy provided by the [Administrative Workers' Compensation Act]."

*Whited v. Parish*, Supreme Court No.119,789.

**Q: Must the employer pay for reasonably necessary medical treatment if a Claimant's injury is found to be compensable?**

**A. Yes.** In *Cameron International Corp. v. Selene Castro*, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed the ALJ's order denying medical treatment, finding that the employer must provide reasonably necessary medical treatment connected to the injury.

In *Cameron*, the claimant suffered an admitted injury to her back and was symptomatic from a disc protrusion. The Form A doctor recommended surgery. The ALJ denied Claimant's request for authorization of further treatment, which included a recommended microdiscectomy, because the ALJ believed the recommended surgery was not reasonably necessary in connection to the lumbar contusion Claimant received.

After a subsequent hearing, the Workers' Compensation Commission reversed the ALJ and found the denial of Claimant's request for surgery authorization was against the clear weight of the evidence and, accordingly, remanded the ALJ's decision for entry of an order authorizing further treatment, including surgery.

Judge Thomas Prince, the newest Court of Civil Appeals judge, wrote a unanimous opinion, and said: "The claimant was asymptomatic before the November 12, 2018, accident...We therefore find, like the Commission *en Banc* before us, that the recommended [surgery] is reasonably necessary in connection with the injury..."

*Cameron Int'l Corp. v. Selene Castro*, Supreme Court Case No. 119,305

**Q: Is an ALJ's order denying compensability proper when the Judge did not consider whether Claimant's injury was compensable pursuant to 85A O.S. § 2(9)(b)(6) and there is a report from the treating physician finding claimant sustained a significant and identifiable aggravation of a preexisting injury?**

**A. No.** In *Fitzwilson v. AT&T Corp*, Claimant filed a CC-Form 3 on December 8, 2016, for injuries to her back and right leg, which she alleged occurred on November 22, 2016, while she "was rolling forward in chair when it toppled over." Claimant's employer denied Claimant suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment.

At trial, Claimant described the accident: "We have roller chairs, and we sit in groups so that we can ask each other questions during phone calls. I had rolled back to ask a question, when I went to roll forward, my chair fell over, and I fell out of my chair." Claimant said she believes her right hip and buttocks struck the ground.

Claimant testified she had four surgeries prior to this event. She had an L4-5 and L5-S1 fusion, she had hardware removed, she had another surgery in the same area, and she had hardware removed again. None of her surgeries involved the L3-4 disk. She had been seeing a pain management physician every three months. She began experiencing

new symptoms after this fall—her pain levels were higher, and she had pain radiating down her right leg. According to Claimant, her prior issues were in her left leg.

The ALJ found that, in light of Claimant's medical records, her testimony was less than credible. The ALJ further found “that Dr. [Hendricks] opinion is based on inaccurate history as her right leg radiculopathy was clearly present prior to November 22, 2016.” The ALJ determined, “age-related degenerative conditions, including stenosis, are specifically excepted from the definition of compensable injury pursuant to Title 85A O.S. § 2(9)(b)(5)” and was not persuaded that [Claimant's] employment was the sole or major cause of her resulting lumbar spine deterioration or degeneration that ultimately necessitated surgery.

On appeal, the Court reviewed recent case law that was found to be persuasive and applicable to the facts of the present case, holding, that even if Claimant's work-related incident, which Employer admitted occurred, was not “the sole or major cause of her resulting lumbar spine deterioration or degeneration that ultimately necessitated surgery” and is excluded from being compensable pursuant to § 2(9)(b)(5), the WCC was required to determine if her injury was compensable pursuant to § 2(9)(b)(6) because Claimant's treating physician, Dr. Hendricks, “found that Claimant sustained a significant and identifiable aggravation of her preexisting injury.”

*Fitzwilson v. AT&T Corp*, Court of Civil Appeals, Division 4, 2019 OK CIV APP 48.

**Q: *May a claimant's permanent partial disability award be reduced because wages were paid in excess of the statutory temporary disability maximum?***

**A. Yes.** In *Martin v. City of Tulsa*, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals found that reduction of Claimant's benefits was statutorily required, and that this reduction did not conflict with municipal code requiring payment of a firefighter's salary during period of disability.

In *Martin*, the Claimant sustained a work-related injury to his right wrist. Pursuant to both 11 O.S. Supp. 2012 § 49-111 and his collective bargaining agreement, Claimant was paid his full wages during his time away from work. The wages received while recovering exceeded the statutory maximum for a temporary total disability award by a total of \$13,526.19. Pursuant to 85A O.S. Supp. 2014 § 89, the city requested a reduction of Claimant's PPD award for this amount. The ALJ granted the request, and the Commission affirmed the award, rejecting all Claimant's arguments that the reduction should not apply to him. Claimant appealed.

Section 89 requires the reduction of a PPD award by the amount of any wages paid in excess of the statutory temporary disability maximum. Claimant argued the ALJ, and thus the Commission, erred in applying § 89 to reduce his PPD award.

Claimant first argued that § 89 did not apply to him because that section only applies in cases where an employer has made “advance payments for compensation,” which the Court agreed was not applicable. The payments to Claimant were simply payments of his full salary, which the city was statutorily and contractually obligated to pay.

Next, Claimant argued that his collective bargaining agreement with the city precluded the application of § 89. The Court rejected this argument finding it clear that the Claimant's complaint is that the agreement simply requires firefighters to receive their full salary

during periods of disability. Additionally, it was clear that Claimant received the salary and the application of § 89 to reduce his total workers' compensation benefit does not alter that fact. Nothing in the collective bargaining agreement precluded the application of §89.

*Martin v. City of Tulsa*, Court of Civil Appeals, Division 3, 2021 OK CIV APP 19; see also *Burson v. City of Tulsa*, Court of Civil Appeals, Division 1, 2021 OK CIV APP 8 (holding that Respondent was entitled to reimbursement of wages paid to Claimant during the temporary disability period in the amount that was excess of statutory limit).

**Q. *Can an Insurance Company intervene in a wrongful death action and assert subrogation for death benefits paid in the workers' compensation claim?***

**A. No.** In the case of *Fanning v. Travelers Insurance Company*, Supreme Court Case No. 119,037, District Judge Barry V. Denney found that 85A O.S. Section 43 is unconstitutional as it relates to subrogation in a death case.

Travelers Ins. Company paid death benefits in a claim in which the worker was killed in a job-related head-on collision. Travelers intervened in the wrongful death action and asserted a subrogation for death benefits paid. The estate of the decedent filed a Declaratory Judgment Action, alleging that the Oklahoma Constitution prohibits workers' compensation subrogation in a death case.

District Judge Barry V. Denney found that 85A O.S. Sec. 43 is unconstitutional as it relates to subrogation in a death case. Section 43 provides that the employer or workers' compensation carrier paying death benefits is entitled to two-thirds of the net recovery in a third-party wrongful death district court action up to the amount of benefits paid, or to be paid in the future.

Judge Denney based his opinion upon Article 23, Section 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution that prohibits the Legislature from diminishing damages in a wrongful death action. Judge Denney wrote: Article 23, Section 7 provides that workers' compensation laws will provide for the exclusive remedy against the employer and that the legislature can only limit death claims against the state or its political subdivisions. This action does not involve a political subdivision and yet, the legislature has enacted a statute that attempts to expand the limitations on death claims--the only thing Oklahoma's Constitution forbids.

*Fanning v. Travelers Insurance Company, Ottawa County District Court, CJ-2018-172, Oklahoma Supreme Court No. 119037*

**Q: *Are injuries that occur during the employee's transportation to or from their place of employment compensable when the employee had been paid mileage to relocate for the employer but was not directly reimbursed for daily travel?***

**A. No.** In *Brown v. Infrastructure & Energy Alts., LLC*, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that Claimant's injury did not occur within course and scope of employment when Claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident during daily commute to a job site. In *Brown*, Claimant and three other co-workers were carpooling to a job site on July 17, 2017, when they were involved in a collision. Claimant was a passenger in the car owned and driven by a co-worker. Respondent did not provide lodging or transportation but expected its workers to be onsite by 7:00 a.m. daily for a mandatory safety meeting.



Claimant had temporarily relocated from Texas to work on a specific project for Respondent. He had been paid mileage to relocate but was not otherwise directly reimbursed for his daily travel from his temporary residence to the job site, except for \$100 per day as *per diem*.

The case's largest contention was related to Claimant's status at the time of the accident in question. Claimant argued the accident as having occurred during employer-directed travel. While Respondent argued the accident as having occurred during the employee's commute to work, which is not included in the Act's definition.

The legislature's intent was clearly to exclude commutes from the definition of scope and course of employment even though such commutes could be considered employer-directed travel generally, and certainly might be in particular situations. Further, the only direction given to the petitioner here was to get to the job site by 7 a.m. The employer was completely indifferent to how that happened and gave no direction to the petitioner as to how to get there.

Finally, the Court addressed the issue surrounding the *per diem* paid to Claimant, finding that it was simply an additional payment to the employee intended to cover the cost of working far from home. Such a payment does not convert a commute to work into employer-directed travel or make the employee incapable of commuting to work from his temporary residence.

The employer gave no direction to the employee other than where to be and when. The employee was not on any special errand but was on the way to the job site where he was to clock in and begin work each day. The employee was solely responsible to choose the method and means of his own transportation. Under these facts, the Court held that the accident occurred during the employee's transportation to and from his place of employment and therefore not compensable.

*Brown v. Infrastructure & Energy Alts., LLC*, Court of Civil Appeals, Division 3, 2021 OK CIV APP 10.

**Q: Is an ALJ's order denying compensability valid when it is based on medical opinions that are not stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty but instead based on Claimant's self-diagnosis with no other reasoning?**

**A. No.** In *Stripling v. Department of Public Safety*, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals vacated the Commission's order affirming the ALJ's decision to deny compensability, finding it was affected by errors of law and not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not consider the medical report submitted to the court finding evidence of cumulative trauma.

In *Stripling*, Claimant was a state trooper with the Oklahoma Highway Patrol that filed his action in May 2017, asserting cumulative trauma injuries to his low back and left hip as a result of his employment. Claimant requested temporary total disability as well as permanent partial disability to the low back.

Claimant presented to his family doctor to receive steroid pills, steroid injections, an X-ray, as well as an MRI of his hip that revealed "significant disc protrusions in the lumbar spine, after which Claimant testified his condition did not improve. Claimant later

underwent surgery to repair the herniated discs, began physical therapy, and returned to his duties as a state trooper.

Counsel for Respondent relied on a medical report that opined the disc herniation was not a result of his work as a state trooper after Claimant reported to him that the onset of his pain was after “jogging.” They also focused on Claimant’s own opinion and belief that the pain he was experiencing was not work related, combined with the fact that he sought medical treatment with his own private insurance carrier.

However, Claimant provided a medical report that stated that Claimant sustained a significant injury to his lumbar spine due to his work-related duties. The report also opined “the sole and major cause of the significant and identifiable injury and need for treatment to his lumbar spine is directly related to the repetitive work-related duties that he was involved in while employed by [DPS].”

On appeal, the Court emphasized that Claimant’s testimony was clear and uncontroverted that until December of 2016, he was under the impression that he was suffering from a leg or hamstring injury, despite suffering from a different injury altogether in his lumbar spine. Thus, the Court agreed that Claimant’s non-expert self-diagnosis should not have been relied upon as a basis for denying his claim.

Additionally, the Court held that the ALJ did not apply a “major cause” test, but instead applied a “sole cause” test to Claimant’s claim. The only medical report in the record to opine on major cause is that of Claimant’s. The medical reports asserting the sole cause of Claimant’s spinal degeneration as jogging rely exclusively on Claimant’s above-discussed self-diagnosis and offer no further reasoning. Thus, they are not stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty and do not constitute substantial evidence.

*Stripling v. Dep’t Public Safety*, Court of Civil Appeals, Division 2, 2021 OK CIV APP 11.

# RECENTLY PASSED LEGISLATION

## HB 1738

- Amends 85A O.S. §47
- Effective Date: January 1, 2021
  - Surviving Spouse and 1 Child
    - Child receives lump-sum of \$25,000 and 15% of the lesser of deceased employee's AWW and State AWW
  - Surviving Spouse and 2, 3, or 4 Children
    - Each child receives lump-sum of \$25,000 and pro rata share of 30% of the deceased employee's AWW
  - Surviving Spouse and 5 or more Children
    - Each child receives a pro rata share of \$100,000 and a pro rata share of 30% of the deceased's AWW

## HJR 1035

- Effective Date July 1, 2024
  - 85A O.S. §50(H)(14) requires the Workers' Compensation Commission to evaluate the Fee Schedule for maximum rates paid for reimbursement to medical providers.
  - This is an approval for the proposed Fee Schedule to be signed by the Governor and the Secretary of the State
  - Signed by Governor on May 8<sup>th</sup>

## SB 1457

- Amends 85A O.S. §13
- Effective Date: January 1, 2025
  - Expands workers' compensation coverage to law enforcement officers, paid or volunteer firefighters, emergency medical technician employed on a full-time basis by a municipality, county, or state, or a volunteer firefighter who suffer from PTSD while responding to an emergency.
  - Does not have to be accompanied by a physical injury.
  - If the first responder is not able to temporarily resume their job function due to the mental injury or illness, they shall receive compensation of the greater of the weekly benefit provided for in a collective bargaining agreement or 70% of the workers' average weekly wage
  - The employer will also be responsible for maintaining health insurance coverage for the first responder, if the health insurance was in effect on the date of the injury

### **SB 1333**

- Amends 85A O.S. §380 which relates to the Oklahoma Volunteer Firefighter Group Insurance Pool
  - The Volunteer Firefighter Group Insurance Pool shall be transferred to the Office of Management and Enterprise Services (“OMES”) Comprehensive Professional Risk Management Program
  - Claims shall be handled by the OMES
  - This is only for volunteer firefighters, not paid firefighters
  - State agencies, public trusts, and other instrumentalities of the state shall pay \$120 per firefighter per year for workers’ compensation coverage
  - OMES shall electronically report the number of enrollees and amount of expected surplus or deficiency

### **SB 1456**

- Amends 20 O.S. §30(14), 85A O.S. §122, and 85A O.S. §§ 400, 401, 401.1
- Effective July 1, 2024
  - Workers’ Compensation Court of Existing Claims
  - Establishes court of Existing Claims Division in the Court of Civil Appeals
  - Replaces the Workers’ Compensation Court of Existing Claims
  - All administrative duties shall transfer to the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Commission

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